For better or worse, a large number of taxpayers in the United States rely on others to prepare their tax returns on their behalf. Both academic research and governmental studies have repeatedly shown that the quality and integrity of tax return preparation services vary widely. Studies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) have found that returns prepared by non-credentialed tax preparers are more error-prone. Additionally, fraudulent preparers often appear on the IRS’s “dirty dozen” list of tax scams, encouraging taxpayers to claim improper credits or deductions. Taxpayers who follow bad advice may face financial penalties, interest, and repayment of improperly claimed benefits. Many taxpayers are unaware of these risks.
Under existing regulations, the IRS has oversight over attorneys, certified public accountants (CPAs), and enrolled agents (EAs) under Section 330 of Title 31 of the U.S. Code, enforced through Circular 230. However, following the 2014 Loving v. IRS decision, the IRS lost the ability to regulate non-credentialed tax preparers, leading to widespread concerns about compliance and taxpayer harm.
Given the attention that this issue has gotten from the government and from commentators over the past decade, it is not surprising to see this issue included in the Taxpayer Assistance and Service Act. Section 504 of the Act takes this issue head on and addresses concerns regarding tax return preparers, particularly non-credentialed preparers who operate without regulatory oversight. If enacted, this provision would grant the IRS the authority to deny, revoke, or suspend a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) based on competence, ethical violations, or fraudulent practices.
Under Section 504, non-credentialed tax preparers must demonstrate their suitability by: (1) passing a criminal background and tax compliance check; (2) completing up to 18 hours of continuing education (CE) annually, including ethics, professional responsibility, and tax law; and (3) attending and participating in IRS-approved educational programs. In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury may continue the Annual Filing Season Program (AFSP) or similar programs to allow non-credentialed preparers to obtain limited representation rights before the IRS and to list certification under such a program as a credential. Attorneys, CPAs, EAs, and tax preparers licensed under state programs with comparable standards are exempt from these new requirements.
These requirements would have teeth and transparency associated with them—Section 504 authorizes the IRS to deny, suspend, or revoke a PTIN as well as impose monetary penalties for: (1) failure to meet CE and suitability requirements; (2) demonstrated incompetence, unethical behavior, or fraudulent practices; or (3) violations of Circular 230. The IRS must publish disciplinary actions online within 30 days, redacting taxpayer information. The agency must also annually report the most common tax return errors and the primary reasons for preparer penalties. Of course, as is the case involving any IRS enforcement action, the success of these measures will depend on sufficient funding and administrative capacity. If enforcement resources are stretched too thin, fraudulent preparers could continue to operate undetected.
Section 504 would go a long way towards addressing the ability of non-credentialed paid taxpayers to pray on the most vulnerable. By mandating suitability and competence standards, combined with enhanced transparency and enforcement mechanisms, the Act would have the benefit of being a stronger baseline legislative solution to the voluntary compliance certification system I proposed as a market-based administrative solution that could create incentives for tax preparers to adopt best practices and align their interests with compliance. But, the Act could potentially go even further to increase even more the incentives for preparer compliance. This could be done with additional provisions from the voluntary compliance certification system that I proposed, which would bolster preparers’ ability to compete on the basis of compliance and help potentially steer taxpayers to preparers with a proven track record of accuracy and ethical behavior. Section 504’s proposed changes implicitly support the idea that preparers who meet education and conduct standards should be distinguished from those who do not and that the use of a preparer that complies with these standards should be recognized as a risk-reducing decision for taxpayers. Section 504 could be strengthened even further to recognize these truths even more explicitly with stronger incentives to encourage taxpayers to select the most compliant preparers. While it might make sense not to include these incentives in the mandatory baseline level of regulation Section 504 is seeking to implement, this could still be done through an additional voluntary training and credentialing system that goes beyond the regulatory baseline and that would offer reduced taxpayer penalties or audit safe harbor thresholds that would apply to taxpayers who utilize preparers who obtain additional certification. In addition, Section 504 could go even further towards ensuring that the most economically vulnerable have access to qualified preparers by including as part of its regulatory baseline aspirational pro bono service recommendations similar to what many state bars have done with the potential for mandatory pro bono service requirements for an additional voluntary credentialing system.
Are Section 504’s proposed changes or my additions worth the potential for increased costs that might be passed on to consumers? While this is a valid concern, Section 504 does at least a bit to address this through its prohibition on requiring preparers to use specific continuing education providers, which can help increase flexibility and reduce undue financial burdens from preparer compliance. Section 504 could reduce the risk of costs passing through to consumers even more through targeted tax credits available to taxpayers who utilize preparers who have satisfied a particular level of training (which fiscally could make sense from the government’s perspective if the increased accuracy and compliance that would result from greater use of better trained preparers outweighed the costs associated with such training).
Section 504 if enacted would be a significant step forward in the IRS’s ability to curtail some of the worst errors and abuses caused by non-credentialed taxpayers. My hope is that this would also be a first step to making compliance more a competitive advantage rather than only a regulatory burden. A future where tax preparers actively compete on their compliance records, rather than their ability to exploit loopholes, is not only desirable but achievable through a combination of baseline regulatory oversight potentially combined with additional market-driven incentives that can help produce a compliance-oriented norm shift among preparers.
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