In Part One of this series, here, I explained that certain pledges to boycott Israeli academic institutions may create a disqualifying conflict of interest for appointment to a university deanship, using as an example the case of Professor Ilana Feldman at The George Washington University.
Professor Feldman’s pledge is further disabling for another, related reason. A dean’s public commitment to non-collaboration with Israeli academic institutions would necessarily discourage faculty, and especially students, from even proposing such a project, understandably expecting that it would be rejected. The Elliott School offers study-abroad programs in Chile, England, France, and Spain, each in conjunction with a local university. These programs are touted as “giving students direct access to high-level academics at some of the best universities in the world.” Feldman’s boycott pledge, however, would prevent her from even considering an expansion of the programs to Israel.
The proscription would presumably include Bar Ilan University, near Tel Aviv, which is the only university in the world that combines “cutting-edge scientific research with education steeped in Jewish values and social responsibility.” Some young observant Christians and Jews might have very important personal reasons for studying at Bar Ilan, or elsewhere in Israel, yet they would have to think twice before enrolling, or even applying, at the Elliott School under Feldman’s deanship.
The ultimate problem with a pledge of non-collaboration is that it goes well beyond a statement of opinion or the expression of a political position. Rather, it is a determined commitment to a particular course of action that, in Feldman’s case, would conflict with the requirements of the deanship of a school of international affairs.
Not everyone agrees with this analysis. Writing on the AAUP’s Academe Blog, John Wilson said of the deanship decision at GWU, “there was one reason: Feldman supports the Boycott, Divest, Sanctions (BDS) movement against the Israeli government.” He later amplified his view in a comment on The Faculty Lounge:
A pledge is not a speech act. It sits there and does nothing unless it is implemented. A pledge is a statement of belief with a slightly different verb. “We must all boycott Israel” and “I pledge to boycott Israel” are identical statements. Both might be troubling if implemented, and both are mere beliefs without implementation.
This position is untenable, not least because it requires rewriting the dictionary. By any accepted definition, a pledge is “a solemn promise or undertaking,” a “binding promise or agreement to do or forbear,” or a commitment “to following a particular course of action.” Microsoft Word provides synonyms for “pledge” such as vow, oath, promise, assurance, undertaking and guarantee. There is no source that demotes a pledge merely to a “statement of belief with a slightly different verb.” It is a quintessential speech act by definition.
In any case, Professor Feldman herself left no doubt about her intentions when she took the pledge, having said that the Israel boycott is a “political act and not just a statement of position.” Moreover, the ultimate resolution adopted by the American Anthropological Association, as submitted by Professor Feldman and others, included this language:
Resolved, That the AAA as an Association endorses and will honor this call from Palestinian civil society to boycott Israeli academic institutions until such time as these institutions end their complicity in violating Palestinian rights as stipulated in international law.
An explanatory section added,
The academic boycott is an act of protest against Israel’s violations and an act of solidarity with our Palestinian colleagues. . . . It provides a concrete and proven way that scholars can participate in amplifying that pressure.
Following adoption of the Boycott resolution, Professor Feldman was interviewed as a spokesperson for the Anthropologists for the Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions. She described the boycott resolution as “first and foremost an action in solidarity with Palestinian society broadly and with our colleagues in Palestinian universities specifically.” Feldman also pointed to a separate petition affirming her “personal commitment to boycott Israeli academic institutions” and her unwillingness “to be silenced.”
There is no reason to think that Feldman meant anything other than what she clearly said. She is a highly accomplished anthropologist, with an impressive publication record, who has explained that the boycott resolution emerged after a “long deliberative process.” It would be disrespectful to suggest that she held some sort of mental reservation allowing her to suspend her principles if offered a deanship. Nor has she ever publicly retracted her commitment to non-collaboration. (She did not respond to my request for a statement.) Wilson offers examples of hypothetical pledges that may be vague or anodyne, but it is a logical error to therefore conclude that all pledges are inert, precatory, or meaningless.
Although I believe that the BDS movement is misguided, I recognize that both professors and deans must be free to refrain from publishing in Israeli journals or attending Israeli-sponsored conferences. I would defend the rights of a dean to advocate divestment from Israeli companies or sanctions against Israel’s government. None of those positions or actions conflict with the academic freedom of other faculty or students.
Conflicts of interest may be waived, but the circumstances are narrow and the requirements are strict. By analogy to Rule 1.7(b), a dean would have to reasonably believe she could competently and diligently fulfill both commitments, and also obtain informed consent, following full disclosure, from all affected parties. In Professor Feldman’s case, it would be impossible to meet either condition. First, as we have seen, the non-collaboration pledge is flatly inconsistent with decanal duties, and it would not be possible to fulfill both concurrently. Moreover, a dean’s constituency is so diffuse – comprising administrators, faculty, and students – that informed consent could never be obtained. Professor Feldman has not addressed this issue publicly, so we do not know what disclosures, if any, she provided to the GWU administration. It is evident, however, that GWU provost Brian Blake determined the conflict to be unwaivable when he announced that Professor Feldman would not be a candidate for permanent appointment as dean.
The virtue of conflict of interest analysis is its ideological neutrality. It is not concerned with Professor Feldman’s reasons for pledging non-cooperation with Israeli institutions, or whether they are either justified or unwarranted. The only issue is whether her pledge has created an unresolvable conflict between her professional obligations and personal interests.
Professor Feldman’s pledge of non-collaboration must be considered in her role as an administrator, rather than only as a scholar. The job of a dean in a school of international affairs is to build bridges to other countries, including those with controversial or even offensive governments. Professor Feldman’s pledge does just the opposite, committing her to a categorical barrier on the basis of nationality, and thus creating an unresolvable conflict of interest that disqualifies her from a deanship. A similar content-neutral rule would be applicable in other cases without regard to politics.
Some good points, but wouldn't disqualifying Feldman based on opposition to a nonexistent Israeli program effectively blackball all BDS supporters from any university leadership position? This logic could be flipped to attack pro-Israeli academics, e.g., "we don't yet have a program with a Palestinian university, but if we did, this Likudnik would oppose it; therefore, this candidate is unfit based on something they haven't yet done." We may want to hold off on banning intellectuals based on these kinds of ideologies.
Posted by: Kent Hamilton | October 06, 2020 at 02:39 PM