In my first two posts (August 3 and 7), I outlined the scope of the law graduate employment and debt problems facing legal education; and described admissions policies at some law schools with persistently very weak employment outcomes that only exacerbate their graduate employment problems. In this post, I summarize my argument for an ABA employment outcomes standard. The entire draft of the article is available on SSRN here: http://bit.ly/2vnfvJf.
The ABA (or more precisely, the ABA Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar) is recognized by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) as the accrediting agency for all programs leading to the J.D. degree. One of the ED’s key criteria for recognition requires accreditors to impose student outcome standards on the programs or institutions that they accredit. Accreditors must have outcome “standards [that] effectively address the quality of the institution or program.” The regulation does not require accreditors to impose any particular outcomes standards, but specifically mentions “course completion, State licensing examination, and job placement rates” as potentially appropriate standards.
The requirement that ED-recognized accreditors have student outcome standards serves two essential purposes. The first and primary purpose is to help ensure that students realize the promise of the degree program. The large majority of law students attend law school with the objective of practicing law. Indeed, the ABA Standards state that the objective of a law school academic program is to prepare students for admission to the bar and the practice of law. Students who complete law school and seek but do not obtain legal employment do not realize the promise of the J.D. program. The adoption of a new accreditation standard on employment outcomes would directly advance the central objective of the J.D. program by requiring ABA-accredited law schools to demonstrate that their student outcomes align with the objective. The argument for an employment outcomes standard is especially compelling where the cost of legal education has become so high.
A subsidiary purpose of the ED regulation is to conserve federal tax dollars. Higher education institutions receive their students’ borrowed Title IV tuition dollars up front and regardless of individual student outcomes, but if large numbers of those students are unlikely to repay their student loans because they do not obtain suitable employment upon graduation, the institution effectively receives an unintended federal taxpayer subsidy. The Title IV loan programs are loan programs, not grant programs. There is a small but not insignificant number of law schools with both persistently very weak employment outcomes and very high average graduate debt. It appears likely that these schools in particular have been receiving a large taxpayer subsidy.
While the ED recognition criteria do not mandate any particular student outcomes standards, the outcome standards adopted by an accreditor must be effective. Currently, the ABA has a licensing exam (bar examination) passage standard and the equivalent of a minimum course completion rate standard (a standard on attrition). While the ABA requires schools to collect and report detailed graduate employment outcomes information, the accreditation standards presently do not address employment outcomes.
An ABA employment outcomes standard would redress a gap in the ABA’s current outcome standards. As discussed in my previous post, the current standards on attrition and bar passage have not effectively constrained some schools with persistently very weak graduate employment outcomes to improve those outcomes. To the contrary, as discussed, some schools with dismal graduate employment outcomes have responded to the decline in law school applications by enrolling more students with markedly lower LSAT scores, almost inevitably leading to lower bar passage rates and further diminished employment prospects for their graduates. Moreover, some of the same schools with weak employment outcomes and large declines in entering class credentials also report high average student debt amounts (or no longer report the amount).
This is a tight summary of the argument for adopting an employment outcomes standard. In my next post, I will address what I expect will be the main arguments against it.
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