As Dan points out, Prof. Jack Katz has written a thoughtful defense of Alice Goffman, and I encourage everyone to read it (here). [UPDATE: It turns out that Katz is a co-editor of the University of Chicago Press series that published Goffman's book, per this article in the New York Times.]
It should come as no surprise, however, that I think Katz got it wrong. In particular, I think he seriously misunderstood the facts and misinterpreted the situation, as I explain below.
Katz wrote:
"I am afraid that this point, that the messiness of the line between posturing and practice is at the essence of the phenomenon, won’t be heard in this context and will probably add to the strength of those who would damn her and outlaw this kind of immersion research…."
The question is not about bravado, however, but behavior. Three men had already been killed in what Goffman calls the 4th Street War, so an armed manhunt – driving around at night, pistol in hand, looking for rival gang members – must be taken as something seriously more than “bravado.” Specifically, Goffman wrote:
"We started out around 3:00 a.m., with Mike in the passenger seat, his hand on his Glock as he directed me around the area. We peered into dark houses and looked at license plates and car models as Mike spoke on the phone with others who had information about [their quarry's] whereabouts. "
I have no interest in banning immersion research, but I think it is pretty reasonable to draw the line at facilitating a shooting. Here is what Sudhir Venkatesh said about that in Gang Leader for a Day:
“If I became aware of a plan to physically harm somebody, I was obliged to tell the police . . . . It wasn’t as if I had any intention of joining the gang in an actual drive-by shooting . . . but since I could get in trouble just for driving around with them while they talked about shooting somebody, I had to rethink my approach.”
Seems quite sensible, and unlikely to cause any damage to immersion research. Too bad Goffman did not follow his example.
Per Katz:
"[W]hen conspiracy laws alone are the only formula available for prosecution, the abuse potential should remain the first and central concern."
Nobody is suggesting prosecuting Goffman now, but only that her active participation in a murder plot should be recognized for what it was.
But let me pose a question for Prof. Katz. What if the police encountered a bunch of Klansmen in a car full of Molotov cocktails, casing an African-American church? Would it be okay to arrest them for conspiracy to commit arson, or would the cops have to wait for the actual torching? I think the answer is obvious. Conspiracies themselves are dangerous, which is why they are illegal. You can provide your own examples: Neo-Nazis and a synagogue; extremists and an abortion clinic; animal rights activists and a university laboratory? In each case it is legitimate – and far from an “abuse” – to arrest people following the first “overt act,” without waiting for the planned violence to occur. A gang murder is no different, and I trust Prof. Katz would counsel his graduate students that it would be a crime to drive the car.
Finally:
"To take actions that usually are histrionic as presumptive grounds for an accusation, much less an official charge, would be a great way to crush this ethnographic fieldwork on 'the other side.'”
Let me repeat: I did not criticize Goffman for anything involving only histrionics. Rather, I pointed out that she helped to search for a man to kill. In her own words, she “wanted him to die.” Three men had already been murdered in the gang war, and Goffman characterized her own participation as part of the “third round.” Her current claim of “just talk,” raised for the first time in her response, directly contradicts the version in her book. In On the Run, she wrote “Many knew the man’s name and the guys he hung out with [and they went] looking for the shooter, the guys who were part of his crew, or women connected to them who might be able to provide a good lead.” In other words, much more than histrionics.
Steve: Strikes me that, whether or not it was criminal, volunteering to *drive* the car was obviously unethical, and demonstrated horrible judgment. But your quotation from Venkatesh goes further: It suggests that it would be wrong for the sociologist simply to "driv[e] around with them while they talked about shooting somebody"--and, moreover, that if the sociologist becomes "aware of a plan to physically harm somebody," she is "obliged to tell the police."
What do you think of these two variations on the question:
i. Can or should the sociologist drive around with the subjects of her study --but not aid them -- while they talk about shooting someone?
ii. Should she -- must she? -- tell the police when she becomes "aware of a plan to physically harm somebody"?
Do the answers to these questions change if she were an attorney in addition to being an academic?
Posted by: Marty Lederman | June 06, 2015 at 05:52 AM
Those are great questions, Marty, and I don't have immediate answers. I am planning to spend some of the summer researching the ethics of ethnology, and perhaps write something for an academic journal.
I am guessing that someone told Venkatesh about the Tarasoff case, and they assumed that it applied to ethnographers as well as psychologists.
In any event, Venkatesh showed prudence, where Goffman obviously did not.
I would be very interested in the opinions of other Faculty Lounge readers.
Posted by: SL | June 06, 2015 at 06:20 AM
Steven, I've been following this exchange with great interest.
I'll leave aside the talk of conspiracy to commit murder because that's far outside of my area of expertise; I'd like to focus on one of your criticisms, which I think is central to the problems with ethnographic research -- how researchers can become so involved with their subjects and take on so much of the perspective of their subjects that they bend their interpretations. This is a problem for intellectual historians in two ways. First, as I've pointed out about historians of the old South, they often become so involved in their subjects that they elevate their ideas. We should not lose sight of the many ways that intellectuals in the old South largely spent their time justifying what to the rest of us is a hideous system. Second, and related, intellectual historians often pick out themes that resonate with them and thus the subjects look more like reflections of the ideas of the historians than they are true renditions of the subjects themselves. Both of these are really serious problems for intellectual historians. I suppose one analogy is to a social scientist who is coding data and then interpreting the results.
Posted by: Al Brophy | June 06, 2015 at 10:38 AM
Steve: I agree with Marty that the Venkatesh formulation goes much further; since you endorse it as "quite sensible, and unlikely to cause any damage to immersion research," and exhibiting "prudence," you are at least tentatively defending it, unless you plan only to censure exactly what Goffman appeared to have done . . . namely, voluntary behavior with intent of promoting or facilitating the underlying crime.
At first blush, the Venkatesh standard (awareness of a plan to physically harm somebody triggers an obligation to call the police) seems highly likely to inhibit other immersion research, for better or for worse. If persons prone to considering criminal activity knew that that a researcher would blow the whistle whenever she or he perceived such a plan to be afoot, how many fewer would permit the researcher to be present? Do we expect researchers to disclose that standard as part of their ethical treatment of research subjects, or can one ethically conceal it? Would we expect research subjects to flush out ethical researchers by engaging in activities like the kind designed to trigger entrapment immunity for those dealing with undercover cops (e.g., if you want to hang with us, take the wheel), and would that affect what we deem to be voluntary participation? Maybe no such research should take place, but I doubt you can assert that this would not "cause any damage to immersion research," unless your notion of "damage" already takes into account whatever ethical standard you'd propose.
P.S. FYI, your update might be misread to imply that Katz's defense improperly failed to disclose his participation as an editor of the series, at least to any reader not following the link, which leads to passages seemingly from an email. These are not necessarily ordinary circumstances for disclosure, and perhaps not even circumstances in which he failed to disclose.
Posted by: Ed | June 07, 2015 at 01:51 PM
Thanks for your comments, Ed. It seems that the field of ethnography ethics is seriously under-theorized.
I did not mean to imply that Katz had withheld information -- just thought it was an interesting fact in the Times article.
Posted by: Steve L. | June 07, 2015 at 07:57 PM