Technology in the Courts

    Much of my scholarship addresses cyberlaw. In order to keep up in this field, I have to follow the developments in two fields: law (obviously) and computer science. For this second area, it helps that I am trained in computer science and spent several decades programming for a variety of businesses. As part of the process of keeping up with computer technology, I maintain my membership with the Association for Computing Machinery, the primary academic society for computer science.

    In this month’s Communications of the ACM, there was an interesting commentary entitled, “Technology Confounds the Courts.” It was written by Keith Kirkpatrick, apparently a non-lawyer. Comm. of the ACM, May, 2014, at 27. In the article, Mr. Kirkpatrick attempts to identify the reasons why our courts often do a poor job of understanding the computer technology that is involved in many modern cases. I found this commentary interesting as it examined a commonly identified problem within cyberlaw from the perspective of a technologist. Two of his points — the age of judges and the narrowness of decision-making — miss the mark. His underlying point — that judges need to understand technology — is sound although achieving the goal may be more difficult than he realizes.

The Misses

    Several times the author raises the average age of judges as a cause of their technological ignorance. See id. at 27 & 28. He also raises a somewhat related issue: the fact that our federal judges are appointed for life. See id. at 29. On these issues being a significant source of technological ignorance in the judiciary, I assert that Mr. Kirkpatrick is just plain wrong. A lot of us grey hairs have comprehensive knowledge of the current technology and how it is used. I could choose many examples, but I will highlight one of the professors I have always held in high regard, Frederick Brooks of the UNC Computer Science Department. According to his biography, Dr. Brooks is 83 years old. He has been a very important leader in the computer science field since the 1950s when helped develop the most famous line of mainframe computers ever, the IBM 360 series. He founded the computer science department at UNC where he is actively involved in researching virtual reality, hardly a backwater area of computer science. Similarly, most judges of my experience are not monk-like. They read the paper (probably online) and even Reddit. They serf the Web. Their exposure to technology is similar to others with busy lives. Mr. Kirkpatrick: age is irrelevant.

    The author also complains about the narrowness of many technological-related decisions. See id. at 28–29. Here, he needs to better understand our legal system. Because we live in a common law country, a fundamental aspect of the system is that the courts render as narrow of a decision as the facts allow. Rather than being a fault, seeking the narrowest grounds for decision has kept the common law functioning for centuries.

The Hit (Well, Mostly)

    Judicial ignorance of technology may not be complete, but its existence is impossible to deny. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The harder question is deciding how this can be changed. Mr. Kirkpatrick advocates for a more specialized court using both the EU’s Court of Justice and the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court as examples. Kirkpatrick, Technology Confounds at 29. For the EU court, “the more complex selection and appointment process involving a disparate group of EU members ... are more likely [to result in judges who are] current on a greater variety of technologies.” Id. For the Japanese court, he suggests that its use of full-time technical advisors will result in more competence. See id. Of course, he did not need to go overseas for examples as the U.S. Federal Circuit with its patent expertise would also seem to qualify (although far from all of the judges appointed to the Circuit have technological backgrounds).

    Personally, I’m not sure how well a specialized, technology court would work. In the U.S., at least, we would still run into the “one supreme Court” language in Article III of the Constitution. Even if a technology court decided a case, it would be subject to an appeal the Supreme Court; indeed, this is the pattern with the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. In my area of cyberlaw, for example, the Federal Circuit often has a better understanding of the technology even though the Circuit might forget the broader purposes of the patent act. Ultimately, though, it is the Supreme Court’s often mistaken understanding of the technology that rules the day.

    More importantly, it is not clear that a technology court is practical. To start with, which technology? As Mr. Kirkpatrick’s article correctly points out, our court system has done a horrible job articulating a functional system of laws for computer software. Part of the reason for this is that even our more techno-centric court lacks any members with the relevant computer science training. The Federal Circuit has numerous judges trained in chemistry and other traditional scientific areas — as well as some trained in history and other liberal arts — but it does not have computer scientists. This is problematic as it has become impractical to be the technological Jack-of-all-trades that it was possible to be through the late 1800s or early 1900s.

    What that leaves is a suggestion in the article that our judges no longer pretend that they can understand all forms of technology without assistance. So, if a court recognizes that it needs help, where does it turn? One source that Mr. Kirkpatrick does not discuss is the lawyers who are representing the parties. There are numerous examples of case where the parties prepared a joint technology statement to help the court understand the issues. Of course, this only works where the parties agree about the technology — something that is less true in intellectual property litigation where defining the technology “your way” is often equivalent to winning. Further, it assumes that the legal team is sophisticated enough about the technology to be able to competently articulate it.

    The other possibility, of course, as Mr. Kirkpatrick suggests, is to encourage the judges to recognize their technological shortcomings and to appoint masters under Rule 53 to help the court determine the technologically based facts. Unfortunately, the limited nature of the rule and the requirements of the Constitution may interfere. Rule 53 only allows masters if both parties consent, Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(A), or if the case is a non-jury case and is “exceptional,” id. 53(a)(1)(B). The Constitution imposes two limitations on the use of masters: each parties right to have the case ultimately decided by a Judge appointed under Article III and to demand a jury trial in many cases.

    Even with the constitutional limitations, however, it would seem to be time to revisit the use of masters in technology cases within the federal system. For non-jury cases, the rule could be easily amended to make it clear that complicated technology underlying a case is an “exceptional condition” that the rule requires. Id. Obviously, the rule has to recognize the jury trial right provided by the Seventh Amendment. It would seem that a master’s report on the technology could be submitted to the jury to assist it in its decision-making in the same way that the report would be submitted to the judge in a non-jury matter. In both cases, the Article III or Amendment Seven decision-maker would be preserved while providing them with technological expertise from a neutral source.

Comments

[Michael Risch]

Interesting, thanks for highlighting. I'm not following your logic on the age thing, though. While I don't necessarily agree with the author, pointing to an old computer science professor to rebut the view that judges are old and don't get technology doesn't convince me.
I think he makes a mistake generalizing, but an example of an older judge might be better evidence of it.

[anon]

And, what of the juries that often decide these cases? Would a "report" be sufficient? Would a teenage jury do any better?

A good piece appeared in the New Republic recently about the sort of rank stupidity of age bias in the tech field. This was also brilliantly portrayed recently in the HBO comedy "Veep."

Unfortunately, this bias extends as well to legal academia. Take a look at hiring there. Talk to some legal faculty members.

[San Francisco lawyer]

Have any federal judges confessed to reading Reddit? I would be interested in hearing about this...

[Jimbino]

Most lawyers and judges are unschooled in STEM, including all on SCOTUS except Breyer. I remember trying to teach Baby Physics and Baby Math to pre-laws and pre-meds. They didn't really want to struggle with real (calculus) physics or any math beyond first-year college offerings, largely, I believe, because the entry requirements for the professional schools look at GPA, and few normal students can pull A's in advanced science or math courses.

When I subsequently studied law at UT Austin, I was not surprised to find that only some 5 out of 140 of my class had any sophistication in math and science--and I'm including architects in that definition.

We Amerikans deserve better: we deserve to be tried by judges and juries that have more science and less religion and superstition, but I'm afraid we'll never get to that point as long as SCOTUS consists of 9 Jews and Roman Catholics who are English, History, Poly Sci and Econ majors. You might think an Econ major would have some sophistication in math, but you would be wrong: an Econ undergrad major need have NO advanced math, including Probability and Statistics.

If I had my way, no person would be fit to sit for the bar who didn't satisfy the requirements for the Patent Bar: Master's degree in STEM or Econ, for starters. As it is now, some 5 state constitutions require belief in god, for chrissake, in order to qualify to practice as judge, advocate or juror. Justice in Amerika is a joke!

[anon]

Is Don Sterling posting on the FL?

[Jojo]

Is "cyberlaw" a category of law? Like torts, contracts and antitrust?

As for the technological ignorance of the Courts, for as long as we've had a patent system, patent holders have whined about stupid judges and poorly written statutes. The only difference with these disputes is that the factual fights tend to be highly technical. The upshot is that these fights are between moneyed parties who have the resources to hire experts competent to advise and opine on the technology.