Search the Lounge


« How the Political Economy of Financial Institution Regulation is Different & The Rise of Shadow Banking | Main | Oh, the Things We Can Do! »

September 12, 2011


Feed You can follow this conversation by subscribing to the comment feed for this post.

Erik Gerding

One thing to think about, Kim, is the asymetry created by administrative law. Ad law tends to make legal challenges easier for those commentators who are looking to challenge a rule. After all the traditional concern of ad law is the classical liberal one of constraining political power. But modern financial reform also worries about regulatory inaction.

What does that mean for your study? Well you would predict that opponents of the Volcker Rule will make more substantive points. Proponents will focus more on "political theater" designed to embarass regulators into acting.

Kim Krawiec

Hi Erik -- I definitely see the "political theater" point in terms of the comment letters. Having looked at some of the other relevant work (all of it post rule proposal that I've seen so far) that seems consistent both with what I'm seeing and what others have observed. The presumably more meaningful agency contacts are a different story, of course -- less theater and almost completely dominated by industry. But I'm not sure the theater bit only occurs when the public or some relevant general interest group favors the regulation in question. I seem to remember seeing arguments (and maybe some evidence) that public opposition to a rule could be harnessed to just occupy all of the regulator's time through, essentially, junk mail that would take their time away from regulating.

The comments to this entry are closed.


  • StatCounter
Blog powered by Typepad