Yesterday’s NY Times Room For Debate commentary addressed Kenneth R. Feinberg’s pay plan, which calls for significant pay cuts (50 percent on average) from the 25 top earners at seven companies that received exceptional bailout help — Citigroup, Bank of America, American International Group, General Motors, Chrysler and the financing arms of the two automakers. In addition to reducing payment amounts, the plan alters the form of the pay in an attempt to better-align incentives with long-term financial health, for example, by shifting some cash compensation to restricted stock that cannot be sold for several years.
It’s unlikely, though, that the plan will successfully dampen popular outrage over high Wall Street bonuses at bailed-out institutions. The pay restrictions do not apply to firms that have already repaid their loans, including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley, which received tens of billions of dollars in government loans and loan guarantees and are expected to make large bonus payments this year. Goldman Sachs raised particular ire, when it reported record profits and bonuses (a pool of nearly $23 billion, the highest ever).
The cuts will hit some firms harder than others. At AIG financial products division, for example, no top executive will receive more than $200,000 in total compensation.
As to banks not recipients of bailout money, the Federal Reserve announced Thursday that it would crack down on pay packages that encouraged bankers to take excessive risks. The proposal “will subject executives, traders, deal makers and other employees of the biggest banks to regulatory scrutiny of their compensation.”
Instead of pay limits, the Fed rules are intended to tailor compensation packages to deter risky practices and reward long-term performance. “The Fed’s plan, which will take effect some time after a 30-day comment period, will create a two-tier system of supervising pay, using different approaches for the nation’s 28 biggest institutions and the thousands of smaller banks, which would be subjected to a review with their regular bank examinations.”
According to Fed chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, “Compensation practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses and financial instability.” . . . “The Federal Reserve is working to ensure that compensation packages appropriately tie rewards to longer-term performance and do not create undue risk for the firm or the financial system.”
The Room For Debate contributors are:
Lynn A. Stout, law and economics professor, U.C.L.A.
Tyler Cowen, economist, George Mason University
John C. Coffee Jr., professor at Columbia Law School
Yves Smith, financial analyst
Nicole Gelinas, Manhattan Institute
In a recent paper, I address the incentives (including, but not limited to, financial incentives) for risk taking within financial institutions at levels that are not socially optimal and pose dangers to the financial system. Although I particularly address the role of traders, sales people, and their direct supervisors in risk-taking behavior, some of the discussion is relevant for executives as well.
Sadly, I fear that the path to sound and strong financial institutions will not be paved solely with compensation reform. Aligning payment incentives with shareholders’ interests has proved difficult enough over the years, without also having to account for the systemic well being of the financial system. Executive pay reform is likely to be little more than a band-aid, when real systemic reform is what’s needed.
As Martin Wolf recently noted in the FT:
A year ago, at the height of the financial panic, the world yearned for a profitable and confident financial sector. It now has what it wants, but hates it. As joblessness soars and the hopes of hundreds of millions of people are blighted, the financial sector’s survivors are thriving. Even bonuses are back. Policymakers have made a Faustian bargain.
Wolf continues by noting that trying to make financial systems safer has made them more perilous. Today, the market is more concentrated, many institutions have become too big or systemically important to fail, and such institutions with an implicit bailout cushion cannot be expected to prudently manage risk. As a result, according to Wolf, neither market discipline nor regulation is effective.
There is a danger, therefore, that this rescue will lead to still greater risk-taking and an even worse crisis at some point in the not too distant future.
Either we impose a credible threat of bankruptcy, or institutions we have to support are made safer, or, better, we have both of these. Open-ended insurance of weakly regulated institutions that take complex gambles is intolerable. We dare not return to business as usual. It is as simple – and brutal – as that.
Prior related posts:
Supersize
Me: Too Big To Fail, and Getting Bigger
Becker
And Posner On The Pay Czar
What
Does Goldman’s VaR Mean?
Bank failure posts:
Failures, Funds, and the FDIC
Bank Failures and FDIC Fund Losses
Bank Failures Update and Future Problem Banks
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