Search the Lounge


« The Inherent, Ineluctable Instability of Financial Institution Regulation | Main | The Volcker Rule and the Limits of "High Politics" »

September 13, 2011


Feed You can follow this conversation by subscribing to the comment feed for this post.

Erik Gerding

Thank you for this response, Cristie. I am struck in reading this thoughtful post and your insightful and nuanced writings over the years how different you (and many other law professors) approach regulator incentives and problems like capture than do many economists. As one point of comparison, consider the work of George Kaufman on regulatory forbearance that lead to "prompt corrective action." It is not just different ways of defining the problem, but also very different models of what makes regulators tick.

As I noted in a later post, many economists have a similar attitude to Kaufman's earlier work about the failings of regulators in the current crisis and what is needed to address those failings. The need to make regulations more automatic has gained much traction in the economic community.

The comments to this entry are closed.

Bloggers Emereti


  • StatCounter
Blog powered by Typepad