Elizabeth Garrett, the provost of the University of Southern California - and a law professor - has been named the new president of Cornell University. She will take over in July. Before joining USC, Garrett was on the University of Chicago Law faculty where she also served as Deputy Dean.
There’s a trope in the kind of low brow movies I tend to watch – a character looks at a friend that he thinks has arrived just in the nick of time to save him, and then realizes that his ‘friend’ brings destruction, not salvation.
I think of that kind of scene when law schools or organizations like NALP talk up JD Advantage jobs as a reason to go to law school, with the apparent hope that filling seats with students headed to JD Advantage jobs will help schools survive. They seem to think that JD Advantage jobs are a friend to traditional law programs.
I tend to think that attending law school to get a JD Advantage job is a poor idea, for reasons others have expressed well. My point here is different – if JD Advantage jobs really are on the rise as the legal services field broadens beyond just law practice, they create an opportunity for disruption of legal education that could create huge new problems for law schools.
JD Advantage jobs can be very good jobs and lead to very good careers. Some legal training helps in these jobs – hence, the moniker, JD Advantage. It’s more than a little vague what the concept includes, but certainly jobs such as compliance fit within.
Here’s the problem: law school provides poor training for these jobs. JD Advantage jobs involve skills and methodologies beyond law – say, statistical tracking of compliance activities or knowledge of how to motivate corporate employees to follow policies – none of which are taught in law school.
Even with regard to the law part of these jobs, the traditional JD training is a mismatch. Law school involves too much common law, at far too great cost, while normally providing far too little education in the complex regulatory fields – say, health care law or employment law – often at the core of these fields.
JD degrees may once have been the best available option but we live in an era of entrepreneurial educators. Both at for profit and nonprofit schools administrators look for needs to be filled and design programs for the gap. Law schools have a monopoly on qualifying students for the bar, but not on teaching law, and certainly not on preparing students for non-lawyer careers.
Today programs for JD Advantage careers are starting to appear, some online, some in other parts of the university. Look for these programs to move offline and into the kind of settings where prestige and networking opportunities are part of the value of the degree. Many of these alternate careers are approaching professional status on their own. History teaches us that occupations that wish to elevate themselves to professions seek educational credentials tailored to the field, and make those credentials a de facto or de jure requirement for employment in the field, in preference to whatever credentials previously sufficed. As that process plays out these new fields will have their own top ranked programs tailored to what they do.
But that’s not the end of the story.
Assume two things happen, both of which are, I think, very likely. First, assume most law schools (trapped by the "think like a lawyer" ideology) offer only JD programs or “use empty seats” subsets of the JD program to people interested in JD Advantage careers, allowing schools with bespoke programs with the full range of methodologies to seize the field. Second, assume that some easing of the accreditation rules for JD programs takes place, allowing schools to offer more diverse offerings than are presently available.
In that setting, the table is set for disruptive innovation. Holding some of the assets necessary to JD programs and with a worldview not beholden to Langdell, and with a regulatory environment open for freshly designed programs, the JD Advantage programs are poised to move up market into JD offerings.
It’s a classic story of disruptive innovation – innovators seize a market not core to the legacy providers, offering solutions that are cheaper and/or better tailored to the needs of those customers. Over time, they are able to improve their offerings, and compete on the home turf of the legacy providers.
We know that for decades there has been a steady drumbeat that law schools don’t actually prepare lawyers all that well for practice. We hear that from students, from law firms, and from clients of law firms. We also know that there’s been an equally steady drumbeat that despite that, most law schools have not fundamentally changed. They continue to offer to students a program unfitted to the task.
Imagine that happening in any other industry. What we have here is a market opportunity for someone able to come in and offer a different product. It’s going to make the entry of Japanese and German car makers into the US market in the 1960s and 1970s look uneventful.
JD Advantage jobs are, I think, the wedge. They have grown rapidly in number, and they will continue to grow. The institutions that arise to serve those markets, assuming law schools don’t come in with tailor made offerings, can build on the expertise they develop in other legal services fields, and provide offerings tailored to the services provided by the modern practice of law.
At that point, just as the movie character eventually realizes that his friend is not really his friend, law schools will see the rise of JD Advantage jobs for the threat it is.
Deana Pollard Sacks, the Roberson King professor of law at Texas Southern University, has developed a talk show, Meet the Professors. The show combines talk of recent social issues with legal doctrine and social science research. The first episode, "Sexy Media, Sexy Kids, Sad Kids," is available now. I think you'll enjoy it.
Another stop on my fall Facebook/OKCupid tour: on October 10, I'll be participating on a panel (previewed in the NYT here) on "Experimentation and Ethical Practice," along with Harvard Law's Jonathan Zittrain, Google chief economist Hal Varian, my fellow PersonalGenomes.org board member and start-up investor Ester Dyson, and my friend and Maryland Law prof Leslie Meltzer Henry.
The panel will be moderated by Sinan Aral of the MIT Sloan School of Management, who is also one of the organizers of a two-day Conference on Digital Experimentation of which the panel is a part. The conference, which brings together academic researchers and data scientists from Google, Microsoft, and, yes, Facebook, may be of interest to some of our social scientist readers. (I'm told registration space is very limited, so "act soon," as they say.) From the conference website:
The ability to rapidly deploy micro-level randomized experiments at population scale is, in our view, one of the most significant innovations in modern social science. As more and more social interactions, behaviors, decisions, opinions and transactions are digitized and mediated by online platforms, we can quickly answer nuanced causal questions about the role of social behavior in population-level outcomes such as health, voting, political mobilization, consumer demand, information sharing, product rating and opinion aggregation. When appropriately theorized and rigorously applied, randomized experiments are the gold standard of causal inference and a cornerstone of effective policy. But the scale and complexity of these experiments also create scientific and statistical challenges for design and inference. The purpose of the Conference on Digital Experimentation at MIT (CODE) is to bring together leading researchers conducting and analyzing large scale randomized experiments in digitally mediated social and economic environments, in various scientific disciplines including economics, computer science and sociology, in order to lay the foundation for ongoing relationships and to build a lasting multidisciplinary research community.
On October 10 the North Carolina Law Review is hosting a symposium on Vulnerable Defendants in the Crminial Justice System. Details are here.
Our panelists and moderators are working at the intersection of these disciplines—criminal law, disability law, critical race theory, juvenile justice, immigration law, and prisoners’ rights, among others. Against the backdrop of a culture of mass incarceration, we will create room for nuanced dialogue regarding the future of the criminal justice system with an emphasis on the vulnerable populations that are drawn into its wake. Our distinguished speakers are: Carrie Basas, Saint Joseph’s College of Maine; Tamar Birckhead, University of North Carolina School of Law; Cheryl Nelson Butler, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; Frank Rudy Cooper, Suffolk University Law School; Shani M. King, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Lisa T. McElroy, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law; Karla McKanders, University of Tennessee College of Law; Katie Rose Guest Pryal, University of North Carolina School of Law; Kathryn Sabbeth, University of North Carolina School of Law; Leticia Saucedo, University of California at Davis School of Law; Brenda V. Smith, American University Washington College of Law; and Nicole Smith Futrell, CUNY School of Law.
In a recent interview with Jeffrey Rosen of The New Republic, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was asked “when you think about your constitutional legacy, who’s your model?” In response, she named John Marshall, the first John Marshall Harlan, Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Thurgood Marshall. She also added “another justice, one who didn’t serve very long, six years, I think, was Justice Curtis, who wrote a fine dissent in the Dred Scott case.” Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis did indeed write a blistering dissent in Dred Scott – and he resigned in disgust shortly afterward – but his overall record on slavery was nothing to be proud of.
Eugene Volokh has an interesting post on a recent Sixth Circuit decision upholding a conviction for misprision of felony. The federal statute, 18 USC 4, provides: " "Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both." But "[m]ere knowledge of the commission of the felony or failure to report the felony, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conviction for a misprision of a felony." Rather, four elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt: "(1) the principal committed and completed the felony alleged; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the fact; (3) the defendant failed to notify the authorities; and (4) the defendant took affirmative steps to conceal the crime of the principal."
Fans of Sherlock Holmes will instantly think of The Adventure of the Blue Carbuncle. An impossibly rare gem, a blue carbuncle, is stolen from a hotel room. It turns up in the crop of a Christmas goose dropped by a man who is harassed by hoodlums. The gem, and the circumstances of its discovery, is brought to Holmes' attention. Upon investigation, Holmes traces the goose back to its breeder, and by a deus ex machina contrivance, encounters a man who is also trying to locate the goose with the carbuncle. Holmes correctly deduces that the man is the thief, and concludes that another man, charged with the crime, is innocent. Back in Baker Street Holmes induces a full confession from the thief, but in the belief that the charges against the innocent will break down and as a matter of Christmas charity, Holmes tells the man to "get out" of his lodgings. "I suppose that I am commuting a felony," observes Holmes to Watson. Legions of Holmes addicts have concluded that Holmes was guilty of misprision of felony. But, transposed to America and the federal courts, was he? The thief committed the felony, Holmes had knowledge of that fact and failed to notify the authorities, but did he take "affirmative steps to conceal the crime of the principal"? Unlike the Sixth Cicruit Baumgartner case, in which the defandant lied to others about the principal in order to conceal the principal's culpability, Holmes simply ordered the principal to leave his premises. Is that concealment? Holmes has taken no affirmative steps to prevent discovery of either the crime or the true culprit, though he may have made it more difficult to apprehend him. He has done nothing to conceal the fact of the crime. Holmes may not have acted honorably, particularly with charges pending against an innocent, but he will presumably surrender the carbuncle to the authorities, who will restore it to its owner, and will reveal that the carbuncle ended up in the crop of a goose. All true; Holmes has not lied to conceal the crime. I'm not sure it's misprision of felony. Indeed, an old 3d Circuit case, Donovan v. United States, 54 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1931), holds that there was no concealment when a defendant remained mute as he and a co-defenfdant were sentenced, although the mute defendant knew that his co-defendant was an imposter for the real co-defendant.
Penn Law is looking to replace Mike Fitts. The "Consultative Committee" - Penn's name, not mine - includes law professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh, William Burke-White, Jacques deLisle, Dorothy Roberts, Reed Shuldiner, and Christopher Yoo. It is chaired by Annenberg School Dean Michael Delli Carpini.
The University is using Korn/Ferry as their consultant. Nominations and names of possible candidates should be submitted directly to firstname.lastname@example.org.
In an earlier post, I told the story of John E. Cook’s trial following the Harper’s Ferry raid. In Virginia, Cook was represented by the Copperhead Democrat Daniel Voorhees, who had based his defense on a ringing affirmation of slavery. Voorhees's trial work was highly professional from the perspective of advocacy, although shameful in its premise. But Voorhees was not Cook's first lawyer. When he was captured in Pennsylvania, Cook had been briefly represented by Alexander McClure, an ardent abolitionist who took a very different approach to the case. McClure was far more principled than Voorhees concerning human rights, but with much less adherence to legal ethics.
Texas Tech University School of Law invites applications from exceptional individuals for a tenured or tenure-track position teaching Oil and Gas, Energy Law, and related courses. Applicants must possess a J.D. degree and have relevant experience such as teaching, legal practice, or a judicial clerkship. Appointment may be made at the Assistant, Associate, or full Professor level. Entry-level candidates must show scholarly promise, as evidenced by publications in scholarly journals, scholarly works in progress, or a scholarly agenda. For lateral applicants, a distinguished record of teaching and scholarship is required. Once hired, faculty members are evaluated and advancement is determined by contributions in teaching, research, and service to the law school and the university.
Please submit your cover letter, resume, and contact information for three professional references electronically to the attention of the chair of the Personnel Committee, Eric A. Chiappinelli, Frank McDonald Endowed Professor of Law, at the Texas Tech Jobs website https://jobs.texastech.edu or www.workattexastech.com. Please reference Requisition Number 1187BR. You may contact Professor Chiappinelli directly at email@example.com. Review of applications will begin immediately and continue until the position is filled.
It seems like a lot of journals were announcing on bepress and scholarstica that they were already full for the year this summer and telling us to check back in the spring of 2015. The few law review editors I've had a chance to speak with tell me that they had very few slots left by mid-August. This causes me to wonder -- and I'm guessing other people have speculated on this, too -- whether we're essentially moving ot one submission window, in the spring? I would think this would have a lot of negative consequences for people up for retention, promotion, and tenure, because I'm guessing that a lot of people are finishing their capstone piece in the summer and looking to place it in the fall.
The image of a lottery ticket is from our friends at wikipedia.
Wake Forest University has initiated the search for its next Dean of the Law School. The search committee, chaired by Provost Rogan Kersh, includes these law faculty members: Chris Coughlin, Tim Davis, Mark Hall, Sid Shapiro, and Kami Simmons.
Many people were troubled when a Second Circuit panel - featuring José A. Cabranes, John M. Walker, Jr., and Barrington D. Parker, Jr - removed Judge Shira A. Scheindlin (EDNY) from a major civil rights action challenging New York's use of stop-and-frisk tactics. Scheindlin had issued a 198 page opinion holding the City liable for civil rights violations. My colleague Anil Kalhan has an interesting new piece up on SSRN considering this situation entitled Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper Appearances.
On October 31, 2013—just days before New York City’s mayoral election—three federal appellate judges, José A. Cabranes, John M. Walker, Jr., and Barrington D. Parker, Jr., hastily issued an unusual order staying two major decisions by U.S. District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, which held that the New York City Police Department’s “stop and frisk” practices involved unconstitutional racial profiling. Acting sua sponte and providing no reasoned explanation, the three judges dismissed Judge Scheindlin from presiding over the stop and frisk cases altogether, summarily concluding that she had “compromised” the “appearance of [im]partiality” surrounding the litigation. Two weeks later, after their order had been widely criticized, the three judges abruptly issued a new opinion casting aside the ostensible basis for their earlier decree in favor of other legal grounds. To support their decision, the three judges relied entirely upon extrajudicial information that—by their own acknowledgment—they “read [in] the newspapers.”
In this Article, I closely examine this episode, which highlights a growing fluidity between adjudication and public discourse. With enormous amounts of news, opinion, and other information instantly available online, it has become trivially easy for judges to independently research matters outside the formal judicial record that they deem relevant to the cases before them. As a result, judges increasingly appear to render decisions based on extrajudicial sources, but without meaningful constraints or norms to guide and limit the practice. The panel’s actions illustrate the hazards in this apparent trend. Throughout the stop and frisk litigation, New York City officials relentlessly attacked Judge Scheindlin in the media for her alleged “bias” against law enforcement, but declined to actually seek her recusal. By validating and giving effect to that campaign—based entirely on what they had read in the newspapers—Judges Cabranes, Walker, and Parker openly permitted the norms of contemporary political discourse embodied in those news stories to displace the norms of reasoned judicial decision making, and unnecessarily inserted themselves into the mayoral election campaign.
Whatever the precise reasons for the conduct of Judges Cabranes, Walker, and Parker, both due process and the quality of their adjudication suffered as a result. And ironically, the three judges also thereby failed to satisfy the very standards to which they sought to hold Judge Scheindlin. The procedurally irregular and substantively deficient nature of their adjudication gave more than ample cause for reasonable observers to question the three judges’ own impartiality and propriety, and undermined the decisional independence that trial judges must enjoy to render fair and impartial decisions that are seen as legitimate across the full spectrum of the public’s diverse litigants and communities.
The (expected) news that Florida State Senator John Thrasher has been named FSU's new leader is here.
This was a controversial search. As the Chronicle details here:
The process in which the board selected Mr. Thrasher had been controversial almost from the beginning. In May, the board’s search committee drew protests from students and faculty members by announcing that Mr. Thrasher was the only candidate it planned to interview at its next meeting. In June, Florida State’s Faculty Senate voted no confidence in the search committee’s consulting firm, William Funk & Associates, which subsequently ceased its involvement with the renewed search process.
The no-confidence statement is here. An op/ed opposing the hire is here. The Tallahassee Democrat editorial opposing his hire is here.
The Spectrum, a SUNY Buffalo independent student newspaper, has extensive reporting on the resignation of Buffalo Law Dean Makau Mutua here. I previously blogged about the resignation, and posted a copy of a remarkable court filing suggesting significant misconduct by Mutua, here.
As reported by Inside Higher Ed, Assistant Professor Steve Cicala, an economist at the University of Chicago, has decided to boycott the University of Illinois over the trustees’ recent decision against hiring Prof. Steven Salaita. In a letter to Chancellor Phyllis Wise, Cicala explained that he would not be presenting a previously scheduled talk at the university’s Chicago campus because she had failed to resist the “influence of donors on faculty speech.”
Perhaps because he is an economist, Cicala seems fixated on the presumed impact of money on Wise’s (and the trustees’) decision. He made nine references to donors, donations, contributions, or funds in his eight paragraph letter, although with no actual specifics. In support of his assumption that Wise had simply caved in to financial pressure, Cicala linked to a packet of Wise’s emails that had been released pursuant to the Illinois FOIA.
Being a law professor rather than an economist, I thought I would take a look at the empirical evidence, instead of relying on a model.
On September 12, retired Justice Stevens delivered the 2014 Harold Leventhal Lecture to the Administrative Law Section of the D.C. Bar. The spech, entitled "Oops!", pointed out what the Justice thinks are "oops" moments in judicial opinions. One such moment, he says, was the failure of the Supreme Court in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission to recognize that there is no constitutional right of a citizen of one state to spend unlimited amounts to influence elections in other states. He likens this notion to Bluman v. FEC, in which a three judge court upheld 2 USC 441e, the federal law barring foreign citizens from political contributions or expenditures for express advocacy. Will Baude, at the Volokh Conspiracy, has an excellent post that focuses on Jessica Bulman-Pozen's argument to the contrary, contained in her recent article Partisan Federalism. I need not rehearse that argument, with which I agree. Rather, I wish to point out a big "oops" moment of Justice Stevens.
First, the reason that the court in Bluman ignored any First Amendment considerations was because it thought the issue was a "foundational question about the definition of the American political community." Judge Kavanaugh, the author of Bluman, noted that it is "fundamental to the definition of our national political community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic self-government." But that is simply not the case with respect to American citizens, whatever their state of residence. One would have thought that Justice Stevens, of all people, would appreciate this fact. He was the author of the Court's opinion in US Term Limits v. Thornton, in which the Court struck down Arkansas's attempt to impose term limits on its congressional delegation. The reason, according to the Justice, was that Arkansas's action was "inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States." It would wreck the "national character" of Congress "that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure. [It] would also sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States." Justice Stevens can't have it both ways. If Congress has a national character it follows that the "people of the United States," not just the people of each state in isolation, have an undivided interest in the composition of that body. The issue of whether the United States is a confederation of states or the organic manifestation of the entire people of the nation was a hot issue in ante-bellum America, but has been more-or-less buried with the dead of the Civil War. It is surprising to see Justice Stevens carrying the banner of the agrarian ante-bellum Southerners, albeit in a fresh context. It is also embarrassing to see his own inconsistency about the character of Congress. Oops!
I’m looking for methodologies that pretty much all successful lawyers use as a core part of their practice. In a larger sense, I’m looking to generalize away from Langdell’s definition of lawyering as mastery of certain core principles and doctrines (modified and carried forward as ‘thinking like a lawyer’), and get to a more complete view of what lawyering involves in all its diverse settings. I’m looking for methodologies comparable to the different clubs in a real golfer’s bag besides the putter, such as the driver, the long iron, and the pitching wedge. In identifying core methodologies, I’m looking to move toward a conception of lawyering that is richer than Langdell’s view of mastering legal principles much in the same way a view of golfing as it occurs with a whole bag of clubs will be richer than a view of golfing as putting.
I’m also looking for methodologies that I think are fit for academic study – methodologies that I think an academic institution concerned with both the occupation of lawyering and society’s need for legal services ought to be thinking about from an academic perspective.
I don’t mean to make a list of useful, or even essential, specialty specific skills (drafting a complaint, writing a contract). I don’t mean to suggest those don’t belong in a fully rounded JD curriculum, but here I am looking at generalizable and worthy of academic study methodologies that can be used to break down diverse problems across diverse settings.
I’m also not looking for providing an understanding of what other occupations do, so that lawyers can converse knowledgeably with them, but that are not in and of themselves part of the work product of lawyers (e.g., creating balance sheets or econometric models). Again, these have a place in a modern curriculum, and all good lawyers need to understand the goals of their clients, but it’s not the current inquiry.
There are functions that I think all lawyers engage in – for example, discovering and evaluating ‘facts’ – but I’m unable to describe a useful methodology that fits in an academic setting. I’m also looking at methodologies that can be taught at at least an introductory level within the constraints of a three year J.D. curriculum – methodologies that would require a separate master’s or Ph.D. track seem beyond the achievable scope.
With regard to the kind of generalizable methodologies core to all the diverse kinds of law practices, I’m pretty sure I don’t have the complete list. I also think that to do this right someone is going to need to do field research, observing what successful lawyers actually do (not just what they think they do). I do have four methodologies, aside from legal analysis of all kinds and legal writing/speaking, that I think pretty much all lawyers use and that are fully worthy of academic study.
It’s been some time since I blogged last, but I have a good excuse: I was moving from Germany to Pakistan. In Pakistan, I’ll be a visiting faculty member for the fall semester at the Shaikh Ahmad Hassan School of Law at LUMS (or, as it is formally known, the Lahore University of Management Sciences). LUMS is Pakistan’s premier private university, a reputation it has had and maintained from its beginnings in the late 1980s, when it started as a business school. Later, schools in the social sciences and humanities, and also engineering, were added; the law school is the newest of the formal schools at LUMS.
While at LUMS, I am teaching a 4-credit hour version of the Comparative Law class that I normally teach at SLU Law (where it is 3-credit hours). I’m also planning to continue some very preliminary research work on recent developments in transgendered rights in Pakistan (for an earlier piece of mine on this subject, see here). Finally, I’m also participating in law faculty discussions about the development of the law school’s research and teaching missions. While the law school is new—with a building for it still being built—a law department existed for several years before the advent of the formal school. This department was housed within the school of social sciences and humanities. With the transition to being a separate school, there are many institutional questions to address and I’m sharing with LUMS some of what I have come to learn over the years about academic and institutional policies in U.S. law schools.
Lahore is Pakistan’s second largest city, with more than 10 million residents, and is situated on Pakistan’s eastern border—in fact, LUMS is located only 18 miles by road from the land-border crossing to India. Both historically and contemporarily, Lahore has been considered the cultural capital of Pakistan. Pre-Partition, it was a major center of higher education for all of north India. I don’t want to sound too much like a Lonely Planet guide here, so I’ll just conclude this summary of Lahore with a personal observation that this is a city full of human warmth, great food, and immense socio-economic change—all of which can be experienced on any given day. In addition, Pakistan as a whole is an immensely interesting country, and especially for comparativists. If you want to learn something new about constitutionalism and the rule of law, political Islam, or law and sexuality, this is a place to come and do research.
Over the course of the semester, I hope to share with readers some of my experiences teaching in Lahore, the challenges and opportunities of spending an extended period of time overseas, and also nuggets related to interesting legal and political developments here. Finally, in closing, let me note that the Shaikh Ahmad Hassan School of Law is doing tenure-track hiring, and would also be interested in short/medium-term visitors. I’m happy to answer any questions people have for me either in the comments below or over email.
Dean Makau Mutua, who has led Buffalo Law for seven years, will be stepping down from the deanship this December. Dean Mutua made some size adjustments in the law school and has also had controversy in his time. (In fact, the litigation with Jeffrey Malkan continues. A filing here, submitted by the dean's co-defendant in the Malkan litigation, is pretty interesting in its own right.)
The University of New Mexico ("UNM") School of Law invites applications for a faculty position in the UNM Clinical Law Program. The Clinical Law faculty position is a full-time tenured or tenure-track position starting in Fall 2015. Entry-level and experienced teachers are encouraged to apply. The Clinical Law Program is recognized as a national leader in clinical education and is consistently ranked a top clinical education program.
UNM's nationally recognized legal education program features innovative classes that combine practical skills training with doctrinal instruction, a 9:1 student-to-faculty ratio, and one of the most ethnically and racially diverse faculties and student bodies in the country.
The University of New Mexico (UNM) provides a diversified package of benefits including medical, dental, vision, and life insurance. In addition, UNM offers educational benefits through tuition remission and dependent education programs.
Minimum Qualifications: Candidates must possess a J.D. degree or equivalent legal degree. Preferred Qualifications: Preferred qualifications include a record of demonstrated excellence, or the promise of excellence, in teaching and academic scholarship and who demonstrate a commitment to diversity, equity, inclusion, and student success, as well as working with broadly diverse communities. The University of New Mexico is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer and Educator.